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CALIFORNIA'S CURIOUS PRACTICE OF "POCKET
REVIEW"
Steven B. Katz*

I. INTRODUCTION

Just as the President has the power to veto without
expressly saying so, the California Supreme Court has
developed a practice of effectively overturning publishable
appellate rulings by denying them publication, thereby
consigning
them
to an uncitable oblivion. These
"depublication" orders amount to review without reasoning,
contrary to the most basic principles of the common law
tradition. I call this the practice of "pocket review." As judges,
scholars, and practitioners debate the questions raised by Judge
Richard S. Arnold's opinion in Anastasoff v. United States,' they
should be aware of this reductio ad absurdum of selective
publication practices, and Judge Arnold's powerful indictment
of the practice.
Because readers outside of California may question the
existence of pocket review, let me start with a concrete (and
recent) example. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act permits a court
to enjoin "[a]ny actual or threatened misappropriation" of a
trade secret.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in a notable decision, held that an injunction was
authorized where "new employment will inevitably lead [an
* Member of the California Bar. Mr. Katz is Of Counsel to the law firm of Seyfarth
Shaw, where he concentrates on appeals and complex litigation in its Los Angeles office.
1. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc). Judge Arnold stated that the tax issue was moot on rehearing because the IRS had
refunded the taxpayer the money that was at the heart of the dispute. Anastasoff, 235 F.3d
at 1055-56.
2. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.2 (West 1997).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2001)

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

employee] to rely on [a former employer's] trade secrets," even
if there is no evidence that a misappropriation has taken place or
that one is threatened.3 Although at least twenty-two states have
adopted the "inevitable disclosure rule,' ' 4 federal courts in
California had repeatedly predicted that California would not
join those states. In November 1999 these predictions were
proved false when the California Court of Appeal, in Electro
Optical Industries, Inc. v. White,' characterized the inevitable
disclosure rule as "rooted in common sense" and expressly
adopted it.7
The California Rules of Court permit the majority of any
appellate panel to certify an opinion for publication' so long as
the opinion "establishes a new rule of law ... or modifies ... an
existing rule ..... ' The rules also permit the California

Supreme Court to reverse the publication decision of the panel,
depublishing an opinion originally designated for publication, or
vice versa.' As with the Eighth Circuit rule overturned in
Anastasoff, and nearly all other selective publication rules, an
unpublished (including a depublished) opinion cannot be cited
as precedent,'" except insofar as it establishes law of the case,
3. Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
4. The doctrine of inevitable disclosure protects an employer whose former employee
goes to work for a new employer, and the new employment is likely or certain to result in
disclosure of the former employer's trade secrets. Stephen L. Sheinfeld & Jennifer M.
Chow, Protecting Employer Secrets and the "Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure" 480 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series No. H0-0050, 2000). A survey of state
case law reveals that the rule is an old one that is seeing increased usage in the courts, yet
remains controversial. See id. at 479-94.
5. Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 111 I, 1120 (N.D. Cal.
1999); Danjaq, LLC v. Sony Corp., 50 U.S. Pat. Q. 2d 1638, 1640 n. I (C.D. Cal. 1999);
Computer Sci. Corp. v. Computer Assoc. Intl., Inc., 1999 WL 675446 at *16 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 12, 1999).
6. 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Div. 6 1999).
7. Id. at 684.
8. Cal. R. Ct. 976(c)(1) (West 2001).
9. Id. R. 976(b)(1). Publication is also permitted (I) under 976(b)(1) where an opinion
"applies an existing rule to a set of facts significantly different from those stated in
published opinions, or ... criticizes with reasons given, an existing rule;" (2) under
976(b)(2) where the opinion "resolves or creates an apparent conflict in the law;" (3) under
976(b)(3) where the opinion "involves a legal issue of continuing public interest;" and (4)
inder 976(b)(4) where the opinion "makes a significant contribution to legal literature."
Id. R. 976(b)(l)-(4).
10. Id. R. 976(c)(2).
11. Id. R. 977(a).
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claim or issue preclusion, or it is relevant to a later criminal or
disciplinary proceeding.' 2
The Electro Optical panel naturally designated its opinion
for publication. It clearly established a new rule of California
law, adopting a controversial extension of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act. The opinion was a contribution to the evolving law
of trade secrets in California and merited publication by the
standards of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, the California
Supreme Court, without any public consideration of competing
views on the merits, ordered depublication."
Electro Optical is a glaring example of pocket review, but
by no means the only one. When the California legislature
passed a determinate sentencing law in 1977,' 4 different panels
of the California Court of Appeal arrived at differing
interpretations of the statute, and hence disparate sentences. The
California Supreme Court simply depublished one side of the
conflict, settling the interpretive questions without elaborating
any rationale, and without reducing the sentences of the
defendants whose cases had been depublished (and who
received the longer sentences, as it turns out). One commentator
observed that "depublication is a process by which legislative
intent may be thwarted and the results of that thwarting are
swept under the rug: the surface uniformity of published
opinions hides a suppressed disparity in sentencing."' 5

II. "POCKET REVIEW" AS REVIEW
Members of the court have over the years freely admitted
that pocket review serves a doctrinal function. Former Chief
Justice Donald R. Wright, who presided over the court when it
began issuing depublication orders in 1971, said that the court
depublishes opinions that reach a correct result, but which
contain "language which is an erroneous statement of the law
and if left on the books would not only disturb the pattern of the
12. Id. R. 977(a)-(b).
13. See Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.

Div. 6 1999).
14. Cal. Penal Code § 1170 (West 1985).
15. Robert S. Gerstein, "Law By Elimination": Depublication in the California

Supreme Court, 67 Judicature 293, 298 (1984).
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law but would be likely to mislead judges, attorneys and other
interested individuals." 6 His successor, Chief Justice Rose
Elizabeth Bird, told a gathering of state bar delegates:
[I]f the Supreme Court is confronted with a petition where
the reviewing court has erred, it must take steps to ensure
that the Court of Appeal opinion does not create confusion
in the decisional law. In an effort to deal with this situation
quickly and still fulfill its oversight function, the Supreme
Court has come to rely increasingly on the nonpublication
rule to decertify a published opinion with which the court
does not agree in lieu of accepting the case for hearing."

Former Associate Justice Joseph R. Grodin, in an article
published while he was still on the bench, was equally blunt:
"Depublication is most frequently used when the court
considers the result to be correct, but regards a portion of the
reasoning to be wrong and misleading." 8
The exercise of pocket review in particular cases has a
strong political correlation. One study of the liberal Bird Court
found that three-quarters of its depublication orders were aimed
at opinions with conservative outcomes.' 9 After Chief Justice
Bird and two liberal justices were defeated in their retention
16. Julie Hayward Biggs, Student Author, Decertification of Appellate Opinions: The
Need for Articulated Judicial Reasoning and Certain Precedent in California Law, 50
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1181, 1185 n. 20 (1977) (quoting private correspondence from Chief Justice
Wright).
17. Stephen R. Barnett, Depublication Deflating: The California Supreme Court's
Wonderful Low-Making Machine Begins to Self-Destruct, 45 Hastings L.J. 519, 523 n. 18
(1994) (quoting remarks of Chief Justice Bird before the Conference of Delegates at the
California State Bar Convention in San Francisco, California, on Sept. 10, 1978) (internal
quotations omitted).
18. Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme Court, 72
Cal. L. Rev. 514, 522 (1984).
19. See Phillip L. Dubois, The Negative Side . of Judicial Decision Making:
Depublication as a Tool of Judicial Power and Administration on State Courts of Last
Resort, 33 Vill. L. Rev. 469 (1988). Dubois studied depublication orders in 569 cases
depublished by the California Supreme Court from 1970 to 1984, as well as a random
sample of 600 opinions from that time period. Id. at 482. He also used a comparison group
of 600 published opinions issued from 1975 to 1983. Id. at 485. He classified an opinion as
liberal if it resulted in (1) an outcome in a criminal case which favored a defendant, or (2)
an outcome in a civil case which favored a debtor over a creditor, an employee over an
employer, labor over management, a tenant over a landlord, a consumer over a seller or
manufacturer, a plaintiff over a tortfeasor, or a claim arising under state laws protecting
individual rights. Id. at 484. He found that 76.5 percent of the opinions ordered
depublished by the Bird Court had conservative outcomes. Id. at 51 I.
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elections in 1986, enabling a Republican governor to appoint
conservative justices who immediately shifted the ideological
makeup of the court, the same correlation continued-in the
opposite political direction.2 °
The varying rate of depublication reflects the same political
correlation. Under Chief Justice Bird, the Court averaged 78
depublication orders per year. Under her successor Chief Justice
Malcolm Lucas, the rate was dramatically higher: an average of
117 depublication orders each year.2 '
"None of this should be surprising," observes Dean Gerald
Uelmen:
To the extent that depublication is part of a court's effort to
maintain consistency in the law, it is not surprising that the
divisions of the court of appeal, dominated by a political
philosophy at odds with that of the supreme court, will see
more of their opinions depublished. 2
Professor Stephen Barnett argued that the "internal
contradictions" of pocket review are causing it "to be gradually
losing its law-making force."23 He rested his conclusion on two
arguments. First, in 1990, when the California Supreme Court
established the first rules of court governing depublication,2 4 it
included a specific provision stating that a depublication order
"shall not be deemed an expression of opinion of the Supreme
Court of the correctness of the result reached by the decision or
of any of the law set forth in the opinion." 25 Three years later, in
People v. Saunders," a divided
court stood by the rule and held
that it meant what it said.27 Second,
Professor Barnett argued that

20. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Supreme Court Retention Election in California, 28 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 333, 335 (1988); Gerald F. Uelmen, Publication and Depublication of
California Court of Appeal Opinions: Is the Eraser Mightier than the Pencil?, 26 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 1007, 1017-20 (1993) [hereinafter Uelmen, Publication and Depublication].
21. Gerald F. Uelman, Playing Center, Cal. Law. 46 (July 1998).
22. Uelmen, Publication and Depublication, supra n. 20, at 1019.
23. Barnett, supra n. 17, at 522.
24. Id. at 523.
25. Id. at 522 (citing Cal. R. Ct. 979(e)).
26. 853 P.2d 1093 (Cal. 1993).
27. Id. at 1098-99 n. 8. Justice George, with four justices concurring, stated,
To begin with, the dissent errs in concluding that by denying review in some
cases and ordering depublication of the opinions in others, this court "endorsed"
the decision in Wojahn. We recently reaffirmed "the well-established rule in this
state that a denial of a petition for review is not an expression of opinion of the
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both the California Supreme Court and the California Courts of
Appeal are increasingly ignoring the rule against citing
depublished opinions as precedent.28 The combination of both
arguments led him to conclude:
The traditional understanding of depublication, which
viewed a depublication order as a rejection of the court of
appeal opinion and a sort of precedent in its own right-a
"signal" sending "guidance" to the lower courts-no
longer is tenable .... The result is that depublished

opinions no longer bear a scarlet "D." Courts of appeal,
and trial courts not bound by a published appellate opinion
going the other way, have the supreme court's blessing to
replicate both the result and the reasoning of a depublished
opinion, as long as they do so without "citing" or "relying
on" that opinion. Depublication thus retains only the
"negative" effect of eliminating the court of appeal opinion
as a published precedent.
While Professor Barnett's illumination of the internal
contradictions of pocket review as an institutional practice is
useful, his conclusion that pocket review's impact on California
law is thereby diminished does not follow. Depublication
removes an opinion from the citable universe. Attorneys cannot
cite depublished opinions without risking sanction. Busy trial
court judges do not have the time to seek out pertinent
depublished opinions. Nor can we expect appellate justices to
often "replicate both the result and the reasoning of a
depublished opinion" only to have that work itself
depublished. No justice will assume he or she has the high
court's "blessing" to do so.) That appellate justices may
Supreme Court on the merits of the case .. " Consistently with the foregoing
principles, rule 979(e) of the California Rules of Court, adopted in 1990,
declares that "Cain order of the Supreme Court directing depublication of an
opinion in the Official Reports shall not be deemed an expression of opinion of
the Supreme Court of the correctness of the result reached by the decision or of
any of the law set forth in the opinion."
Id. (internal citations omitted). Two justices dissented, stating, "This court's denials of
review and orders of depublication in numerous cases following the decision in People v.
Wojahn cannot simply be dismissed as meaningless." Id. at I110 (Kennard, J., dissenting)
(internal citations omitted).
28. See generally Barnett, supra n. 17, at 548-65.

29. Id. at 566-67.
30. Id. at 567.
31. Id.
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sometimes in extreme cases ignore the noncitation rule does
nothing to change the practicalities of pocket review. Electro
Optical illustrates these practicalities with clarity. Having
depublished an opinion adopting the inevitable disclosure rule
against the background of three federal court predictions to the
contrary,32 the California Supreme Court sent the strongest of
signals that it concurred with the federal courts and disapproved
the doctrinal stance adopted by the California Court of Appeal.
III. ANASTASOFF'S CRITIQUE OF "POCKET REVIEW"

The practice of pocket review is not a necessary
consequence of California's selective publication standards.
Rather, it is a consequence of the conjunction of two additional
rules: (1) the denial of precedential value to unpublished
opinions (including depublished ones), and (2) the power of the
California Supreme Court to summarily review and reverse
publication rulings of the subordinate appellate courts. 3 While
the latter rule is best known in California,34 Judge Arnold's

opinion in Anastasoff speaks powerfully to the former.
At the heart of Anastasoff s analysis is the notion that
reasoned elaboration is the central principle of common law
decisionmaking:
Inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and
interpretation of a general principle or rule of law.... This
declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary
for the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to
similarly situated parties.35
Because this principle (which Anastasoff calls "the doctrine
of precedent") was already "the historic method of judicial
decision-making" 3 6 by the time the great pre-revolution English
32. See supra n. 5.

33. Ironically, the California Supreme Court lacks that power over its own opinions, all
of which must be published. See Cal. R. Ct. 976(a) (West 2001) ("All opinions of the
Supreme Court shall be published in the Official Reports.").
34. See J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California Appellate System, 45 Hastings L.J.

433, 496 (1994) (" California appears to be the only jurisdiction in the country to permit its
highest court to control the development of the law by depublishing court of appeal
opinions.").
35. Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 899-900 (citations omitted).
36. Id. at 900.
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commentators (Sir William W. Blackstone, Sir Edward Coke,
and Sir Matthew Hale) wrote,37 it was central to the Framers'
understanding of what the judicial power was (and is).38 Thus,
the Anastasoff court concluded:
[I]n the late eighteenth century, the doctrine of precedent
was well-established in legal practice (despite the absence
of a reporting system), regarded as an immemorial custom,
and valued for its role in past struggles for liberty. The duty
of courts to follow their prior decisions was understood to
derive from the nature of the judicial power itself and to
separate it from a dangerous union with the legislative
power. The statements of the Framers indicate an
understanding and acceptance of these principles. We
conclude therefore that, as the Framers intended, the
doctrine of precedent limits the "judicial power" delegated
to the courts in Article 11. 39
The force of Anastasoff s common-law argument has
already been rejected by the California courts. Earlier this year,
in Schmier v. Supreme Court,n° the Court of Appeal sustained
California's selective publication system against challenge by
holding that "[t]he broad constitutional and legislative authority
granting the Supreme Court selective publication discretion"'
supersedes any received common law. Although the court did
not focus specifically on the elements of California's selective
publication rules that make pocket review possible, it
nevertheless offered a justification for them by linking this
"broad constitutional and legislative authority" directly to "a
policy that California's highest court, with its supervisory
powers over lower courts, should oversee the orderly
development of decisional law." 43 The Schmier court offered no
authority, or even elaborated reason, to connect the California

37. Id. at 900-901.
38. Id. at 902-903.
39. Id. at 903.
Dist. Div. 5 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 382
40. 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Cal. App. Ist
(2000).
41. Id. at 584.
42. Id. at 584-85.
43. Id. at 584.
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Supreme Court's general "supervisory powers" to the
extraordinary practice of pocket review. 44
The "broad constitutional and legislative authority" to
which the Schmier court appealed turns out to be not quite as
broad as one would think. 45 The court cited two bases for this
authority. 46 The first was Article VI, section 14 of the California
State Constitution:
The Legislature shall provide for the prompt publication of
such opinions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal as
the Supreme Court deems appropriate, and those opinions
shall be available for publication by any person. Decisions
of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that determine
causes shall be in writing with reasons stated.47

The second was section 68902 of the California Government
Code, entitled Publicationof Official Reports:
Such opinions of the Supreme Court, of the courts of
appeal, and of the appellate divisions of the superior courts
as the Supreme Court may deem expedient shall be
published in the official reports. The reports shall be
published under the general supervision of the Supreme
48

Court.

While both of these provisions clearly authorize selective
publication of appellate decisions and the promulgation of court
rules that define criteria for publication, neither provides any
clear warrant to limit the precedential value of nonpublished
opinions, let alone link such a limitation with the California
Supreme Court's traditional function of "oversee[ing] the
orderly development of decisional law.", 49 This is the link that
forges the practice of pocket review. Indeed, the second clause
of Article VI, section 14, requiring that all determinations of
"causes" be in writing, implies disapproval of any practice by
which the court fulfills this function by means other than the sort

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Cal. Const. art. VI, § 14.

48. Cal. Govt. Code § 68902 (West 1997).
49. Schnier, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584.
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of reasoned elaboration that has always been associated with the
practice of determining a cause in writing. °
Defenders of pocket review will rejoin that when the
California Supreme Court depublishes an opinion it is not
determining a cause-rather, it is simply exercising its "general
supervision" 'powers to determine when publication is
"appropriate."
Moreover, it does so "in writing" -the court
issues a written order directing depublication." While these
rejoinders are correct (although the latter is only trivially so,
since the California Supreme Court never elaborates, in a
depublication order, the reasons for its decision), they miss the
point. It does not follow that because neither Article VI, section
14 of the California Constitution nor Government Code section
68902 forbid pocket review, they must therefore permit it. In
fact, they neither permit nor forbid the practice of pocket review.
As Anastasoff teaches, the principle of reasoned elaboration was
firmly part of the English (and eighteenth century American)
common law.53 While California positive law may depart from
that principle, the Schmier court's elaboration of how it has done
so is not well taken. The practice of pocket review stands sorely
in need of a justification.
IV. "POCKET REVIEW" AS A NECESSARY EVIL
The only justification that has been advanced for the
practice of pocket review is a practical one: the California
Supreme Court cannot assert adequate control over the
development of California law through direct review alone. In
an essay dedicated to explaining "the reasons for the practice
and its continuance," Justice Grodin defended "the dominant
view within the court that the selective exercise of the
depublication option is both practical and proper."' 4 He
described the daunting workload of the court and the
administrative techniques used to cope with it.55 Largely
50. Cal. Const. art. VI, § 14.
5I. Schmier, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584.
52. Cal. Const. art. VI, § 14.
53. See generally Anastasoff,223 F.3d at 899-904.

54. Grodin, supra n. 18, at 515.
55. See id. at 515-20.
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dismissing the alternatives to depublication,56 he arrived at a
lesser-of-evils justification:
Winston Churchill once said of democracy that it is the
worst form of government except for all the others. Though
I would scarcely liken depublication to democracy, the
same logic applies .... [I]f the choices are to grant a

hearing or to deny and leave published an opinion that
could lead to compounded error, the depublication
alternative is preferable, though certainly not ideal.57
By "published... opinion that could lead to compounded
error,"58 Justice Grodin meant to refer to situations in which
"permitting the appellate opinion to stand as citable precedent
may result in building ultimately reversible error into a large
number of trials." 59 Justice Grodin never explained how it could
be that such an opinion is not worthy of direct review. The
implication is that there are simply too many such opinions to all
be reviewed by the court.60
V. CONCLUSION

In the end, perhaps pocket review is the only practical
means for the seven justices of the California Supreme Court to
deal with the doctrinal torrent rushing forth from the pens of
ninety-three justices in eighteen autonomous districts or
divisions of the Court of Appeal. But reasoned elaboration is the
soul of our common law tradition. And the discipline of the
written page has always been central to reasoned elaboration on
the appellate level.

56. See id. at 523-28.
57. Id. at 528.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 520.
60. This conclusion is also an implication of Justice Grodin's endorsement of selective
review as a practice that "would eliminate the need for depublication in a substantial
number of cases." Id. at 528.
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To paraphrase the Gospels, 6' how does it profit the court to62
gain control over the "orderly development of decisional law"
through a means by which it loses its own soul?

61. See Matthew 16:26 (New Intl.); Mark 8:36 (New Intl.); Luke 9:25 (New Intl.).
62. Schmier, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584.

